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Abstract
The issues surrounding 'Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation' (REDD)
have become a major component of continuing negotiations under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This paper aims to address two key requirements of
any potential REDD mechanism: first, the generation of measurable, reportable and verifiable
(MRV) REDD credits; and secondly, the sustainable and efficient provision of emission reductions
under a robust financing regime.
To ensure the supply of MRV credits, we advocate the establishment of an 'International Emission
Reference Scenario Coordination Centre' (IERSCC). The IERSCC would act as a global clearing
house for harmonized data to be used in implementing reference level methodologies. It would be
tasked with the collection, reporting and subsequent processing of earth observation,
deforestation- and degradation driver information in a globally consistent manner. The IERSCC
would also assist, coordinate and supervise the computation of national reference scenarios
according to rules negotiated under the UNFCCC. To overcome the threats of "market flooding"
on the one hand and insufficient economic incentives for REDD on the other hand, we suggest an
'International Investment Reserve' (IIR) as REDD financing framework. In order to distribute the
resources of the IIR we propose adopting an auctioning mechanism.
Auctioning not only reveals the true emission reduction costs, but might also allow for incentivizing
the protection of biodiversity and socio-economic values. The introduced concepts will be vital to
ensure robustness, environmental integrity and economic efficiency of the future REDD
mechanism.
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Introduction
The REDD process and the need for observations and 
decision support
Post-2012 emission mitigation strategies must lead to
drastic emission reductions of greenhouse gases (GHGs)
to prevent dangerous climate change. Accounting for
some 18 percent of global anthropogenic GHG emissions
in 2004 the reduction of emissions from deforestation
and forest degradation (REDD) has become a prominent
potential mitigation wedge. In effect, demonstration
activities have flourished since the mandate given in the
Bali Road Map of 2007 (UNFCCC Decision 2/CMP.13).
Initiatives include the World Bank-hosted Forest Carbon
Partnership Facility and Forest investment program, the
UN-REDD program, Norway's International Climate and
Forest Initiative, Australia's International Forest Carbon
Initiative, and many other bilateral and private programs
and projects. About 40 developing countries have already
engaged in the process of designing REDD strategies. At
times these various initiatives struggle to identify their
synergies and avoid confusion regarding methodological
and technical challenges. In particular, any system gener-
ating REDD credits is likely to operate within the scope of
the principles stated in the Poznan Ministerial statement.
These include, inter alia, the development of transparent,
collaborative, balanced and inclusive international
arrangements to support national REDD efforts. Decision
makers also stressed that a reliable framework for measur-
ing, reporting and verification (MRV) is crucial to the
integrity and credibility of REDD. Key to the supply of
MRV REDD credits is robust and consistent greenhouse
gas (GHG) observation and monitoring systems com-
bined with sound accounting methodologies and appro-
priate reference emission scenarios of deforestation and
forest degradation (DD).
With respect to GHG accounting much progress has been
achieved so far. It is generally believed that cost effective
systems for estimating and monitoring deforestation and
changes in carbon stocks can be designed and imple-
mented using a combination of remote sensing assess-
ments and ground based measurements [1]. However,
guidance is needed to ensure comparable estimates when
remote sensing is used, along with access to data, know-
how and capacity building. Addressing forest degradation
is especially difficult in this regard, but knowing the
causes of degradation can help in designing meaningful
stratified sampling approaches to measure it.
In short, the observation and monitoring challenges
should not be viewed as a stumbling block for REDD pol-
icies to go ahead. However, efforts must be coordinated
and streamlined through a robust international institu-
tional arrangement, otherwise the environmental integ-
rity and economic effectiveness of REDD is at risk.
Challenges in the design of reference levels and financial 
compensation
One of the most challenging aspects in designing a REDD
mechanism is the estimation of reference levels (RL). They
describe the amount of net/gross emissions and removals
from a geographical area under a business-as-usual (BAU)
development path. By describing the future emission
pathway without any climate protection measures, refer-
ence scenarios are crucial to determine the success of
emission reduction performances. Reference level can be
solely based on historical emission trajectories or addi-
tionally take into account circumstances such as global
deforestation rate, national forest area or deforestation
drivers [2,3].
When it comes to setting RL there is less clarity on an
agreeable methodology. This is related to different coun-
try circumstances and interests. On the one hand, coun-
tries with low past deforestation rates and potential high
future deforestation will not agree to purely historically
derived RL. To benefit from REDD and to prevent future
deforestation those parties will rather propose to consider
'national circumstances' for RL setting, e.g. through a so-
called 'Development Adjustment Factor'. On the other
hand, many developing countries still lack sufficient tech-
nical and expert capacity to develop proper RL methodol-
ogies. Furthermore, if the process of developing and
reporting such RL is not carefully designed, there is a risk
of creating a so-called "lemons market" [4]. This occurs
when the seller knows considerably more about the real
quality of a product than the buyer, resulting in a reduced
quality of supply of the respective product. In a REDD
context, the "lemons" would materialize in the form of
globally inconsistent and inflated RL adjustments, leading
to non-additional emission reductions. Under a carbon
market scheme this potentially results in an oversupply of
cheap REDD credits. Because negative emission deviation
from the RL would be matched by financial compensa-
tion, a credible method for the measurement of addi-
tional REDD units is absolutely essential for financial
efficiency in the light of scarce resources dedicated to
REDD [5] and avoiding the risk of artificial RL inflation
[6].
Besides RL design the choice of the financial mechanism
for a future REDD regime is intensely debated. Again, this
is partly related to different developing country circum-
stances, but here the discussion is dominated by concerns
about managing the potential oversupply for REDD cred-
its under a market or lacking demand under a fund mech-
anism. Another major concern is the negative socio-
economic and environmental effect of a sole carbon focus
for REDD [7]. To overcome these risks the REDD mecha-
nism might distribute compensation benefits (e.g. credits)
not only based on the amount of emissions reduced, butCarbon Balance and Management 2009, 4:11 http://www.cbmjournal.com/content/4/1/11
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also on the ecological and social value of the forests in
question. Ideally, such form of REDD mechanism would
aim to distribute credits to those REDD activities that pro-
vide the maximum total benefit from emission reduction,
ecological and social values. However, since the financial
consideration of co-benefits is currently only favoured by
some parties its compulsory inclusion is likely to overbur-
den the REDD policy negotiations. Additionally, financ-
ing and monitoring challenges previously mentioned also
apply to co-benefit valuation.
This paper describes two linked proposals for the essential
building blocks of REDD policy implementation. First, we
propose an institutional REDD design aimed at generat-
ing globally consistent reference scenarios at the country
level from which to derive MRV REDD credits. The second
part of the paper describes a possible financial mechanism
design for generating such REDD credits in an economi-
cally efficient manner, while incentivizing the valuation
of forest co-benefits.
Discussion
Institutional support for transparent, fair and efficient 
reference level setting
Globally consistent DD emission reference scenarios at
the national level are important for a large number of rea-
sons. These include avoiding international leakage as well
as ensuring transparency, fairness and efficiency. Fairness
relates to the issue of relative distributional gain of finan-
cial resources made available. Compensation of future
REDD actions against a historical RL will favour countries
with a high historical emissions on a relative scale. This
will increase the risk that future drivers of deforestation
geographically shift to historical low deforestation coun-
tries and, thus, create asymmetric winner/looser profiles
between REDD countries. In this sense low deforestation
countries loose out two times under a purely historical
baseline setting. First their supply potential for REDD is
decreased and secondly their true baseline will be pushed
up due to international leakage of REDD actions imple-
mented in high deforestation countries. On a total market
level "over-compensation" by countries with historically
high deforestation due to a grandfathering rule will com-
promise both environmental integrity and cost effective-
ness of REDD. Finally, such 'over-compensation' could
lead to the supply of non-additional emission reductions
and thus to an inflation of REDD credits [8].
Irrespective of the fact that reliable historical DD data do
not exist for the Pan-tropical belt, the currently proposed
methods to quantify RL on historical information will be
insufficient without the consideration of national circum-
stances (drivers) and global data streamlining. Thus, we
propose a system of establishing reliable and acceptable
RLs based on a global forest information coordination
body and RL algorithm implementation centre.
Data and quality requirements for reference level 
determination
The determination of the 'true' RL will not only shape glo-
bal efficiency, but also be an important component for
countries' planning REDD actions - regardless of how
emissions reduction will be credited for. It is important to
note that the 'true' BAU scenario does not have to be the
same as the crediting RL [9]. The latter can be influenced
by the 'Development Adjustment Factor' or eventually be
the outcome of a negotiated "formula". Pure reliance on
negotiation, however, potentially leads to political bar-
gaining by strong actors. This could disadvantage less
powerful developing countries in gaining financial access
to REDD resources and threaten the environmental effec-
tiveness of the REDD mechanism.
In the interest of fairness and efficiency, the final aim for
RL determination will be that the 'true' BAU scenario and
the crediting RL converge or in cases where the tropical
countries are willing to take on responsibilities the credit-
ing RL should be below the 'true" BAU baseline. To
achieve this aim, it is essential to set up and implement
harmonized and/or standardized rules and procedures for
the collection, interpretation and consistent processing of
various sources of forest data. These include earth obser-
vation data [10,11] as well as socio-economic data on the
basic drivers and pressures for deforestation at national
and international levels.
Data may include historical deforestation area measure-
ments, estimates of the associated emissions and their
uncertainties, current forest carbon stocks and carbon
stock-change maps partitioned by the various carbon and
nitrogen pools (e.g. soil, litter), and forest stand structure
(e.g. species, age structure). These data can be sourced
from a multitude of independent remote sensing instru-
ments and their derived products such as http://www.geo-
wiki.org[12], as well as from in situ data (primarily forest
inventories) and possibly biophysical ecosystem models.
What is important is that the data used by different coun-
tries should be publicly known, and models should be
applied in a consistent manner by those countries, accord-
ing to specific data and interoperability standards as well
as to the respective greenhouse gas (GHG) accounting
rules (e.g. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
and the Global Earth Observation System of Systems).
The modelling tools themselves should also be standard-
ized and certified.
Other types of input, necessary for countries to undertake
consistent development of reference scenarios and plan-
ning of REDD policies, include activity data relating to theCarbon Balance and Management 2009, 4:11 http://www.cbmjournal.com/content/4/1/11
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respective pressures and drivers of deforestation, as well as
information on forest management planning, forestry
supervision and inspection. Depending on the overall
policy context of REDD implementation, such informa-
tion should inter alia include not only forest ownership
information, forest management plans with associated
annual allowable cuts (AACs), and forest protection, but
also information such as transportation infrastructure
development, agricultural management data and food
consumption projections. Such country-specific driver
and governance information would have to be in line
with scenarios of environmental and social change in a
globally consistent manner. Consequently, emission
pathways would also be generated in a consistent manner,
addressing the issue of international leakage and possible
GHG leakage to other sectors. An example would be land
use related leakage in terms of N2O emissions to the agri-
cultural sector where REDD constraints land expansion,
which must be compensated by intensified cultivation.
Both earth observation data and deforestation driver
information could either be collected by national constit-
uencies, according to a negotiated standard, or by interna-
tional agencies in cooperation with national entities. In
many countries, substantial capacity-building efforts
would have to be undertaken to provide this information
according to globally applicable standards, with sufficient
quality and in a geographically explicit manner - if possi-
ble. Most importantly, earth observation data on past and
the current state of the forest as well as DD driver informa-
tion have to be collected, reported and subsequently proc-
essed in a globally consistent manner.
To achieve this globally consistent use of data and models,
and thereby to arrive at fair and efficient REDD reference
scenarios, a specific international institutional entity will
be needed for the collection, interpretation and consistent
processing of various sources of DD-related information
at national and international levels. Figure 1 depicts a pos-
sible constellation of stakeholders and associated infor-
mation flows.
The International Emission Reference Scenario 
Coordination Centre
To overcome the mentioned challenges we propose an
International Emission Reference Scenario Coordination
Centre (IERSCC) to assist countries in developing interna-
tionally recognized and accepted reference levels. It would
act as a clearing house for harmonized data use in refer-
ence scenario modelling. The IERSCC, hosted by an inde-
pendent forestry or land resources research institution of
international status, will be tasked to develop global inte-
grated assessment model(s) to deliver sector-specific
national scenario information (e.g. trade flows, prices,
socio-economic development information) to the respec-
tive REDD host countries. The latter would use this infor-
mation as exogenous variables driving their national
reference scenario model/algorithms. Ideally, these sce-
narios would, in turn, be determined by using geographi-
cally explicit, economic, bottom-up type models, whose
methodologies could be validated by this or another
international validation entity. Such international quality
assurance would ensure internationally recognizable
REDD reference scenarios of a national model(s) by pro-
viding confidence and information security to parties.
Our proposed IERSCC would receive inputs from the
respective UNFCCC bodies, in the form of agreed GHG
accounting rules, as well as rules (possibly in algorithmic
form and parameterization) of the computation proce-
dures for globally consistent national reference scenarios.
In this way, the IERSCC would function as an independ-
ent technical implementation body to the UNFCCC pol-
icy process by supporting and validating consistent
collection of earth observation and other DD driver data,
based on rules defined by the UNFCCC policy process.
The body could also be tasked with developing and apply-
ing calibration routines of global top-down modelling
with national bottom up modelling to generate consist-
ency between the two.
National-level emission reference scenarios should, as far
as possible, be based on geographically explicit data and
analysis and allow for down-scaling of national scenarios
to assist regional or project level activities. The latter
Institutional set up for determining harmonized reference  emission scenarios for REDD Figure 1
Institutional set up for determining harmonized ref-
erence emission scenarios for REDD. Under the pro-
posed system national governments would collaborate with 
the International Emission Reference Scenario Coordination 
Centre (IERSCC) to build national capacity and to collect rel-
evant deforestation driver and earth observation information. 
The IERSCC will assist countries in developing rules for 
establishing globally consistent national reference levels. Rele-
vant entities such as the Conference of the Parties (COPs) to 
the UNFCCC, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
other linked international treaties can support and guardrail 
this process. (EO = Earth Observation, DD = Deforestation 
and Degradation, R = Rules, C = Consistency).Carbon Balance and Management 2009, 4:11 http://www.cbmjournal.com/content/4/1/11
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would allow for tailored and targeted national and inter-
national REDD actions, since the quantity and the loca-
tion of deforestation drivers would be better understood
[6]. Furthermore, consistent RL setting will be essential for
the economic efficiency of international REDD-related
compensation mechanisms. Finally, the IERSCC could
help in building capacity for REDD response strategies
through additional scenario analysis and training of
national experts on these issues. It will enable them to
conduct their own analysis on national implementation
strategies, but also to use part of the IERSCC's data to
inform their negotiation strategies in a global context. Fur-
thermore, the IERSCC model results could be used on the
individual national level for many other land-use related
planning purposes ranging from the analysis of agricul-
tural development strategies all the way to infrastructure
planning.
A REDD finance mechanism ensuring economic 
and environmental integrity
In the following section we introduce a novel financing
approach for REDD, which is able to use the advantages
of current proposals while minimizing their disadvan-
tages.
Additionally we specify its functioning under an auction-
ing mechanism. We will show that this innovative
approach optionally allows maximizing social and biodi-
versity co-benefits (in the following referred to as sustain-
ability co-benefits) while ensuring economic efficiency.
Combining fund and market strength under an 
'International Investment Reserve'
While the risks of direct carbon market inclusion of REDD
credits are widely acknowledged, a fund approach might
run short of the necessary financing to significantly reduce
deforestation. Market-linked approaches like the TDERM
[13] and Dual Markets approach [14] do not solve this
dilemma, since they provide little incentives for Annex-1
governments to commit to ambitious REDD targets (and
thus costs) besides their fossil fuel targets. In the light of
current financial constraints on public spending due to
the economic crisis and at the same time the overwhelm-
ing financing need for climate change adaptation and
technology transfer, funds - no matter if originating from
AAU earmarking, taxes or other sources- will be con-
strained.
An interesting alternative is provided by a so-called 'Inter-
national Investment Reserve' (IIR) for REDD, based on
the idea of a "Carbon Federal Reserve" (CFR) [15]. Under
the IIR approach REDD providers (developing country
governments and/or private carbon projects) would sell
their, yet to be created, REDD units to the IIR at an agreed
price. The REDD unit price should be below the carbon
market credit value and possibly be discounted due to
implementation risk and measurement uncertainties
[16,17]. The IIR would be financed and managed by
Annex-1 governments and possibly private investors.
Contributions to the IIR could either be on a voluntary or
mandatory basis. Participation for investments would be
driven by the economic attractiveness of this scheme.
Basically the IIR serves as investment bank for REDD, in
which investors provide finance to buy REDD units. These
units are then verified and banked, until market condi-
tions are favorable to resell them as fungible MRV-based
REDD credits to the carbon market. Given the long-term
global emission reduction requirements many models
project rising carbon credit prices [18]. This will allow
considerable reselling profits - making the IIR an attractive
investment option. To avoid market flooding the reselling
can be made conditional, e.g. upon a maximum amount
of credits per year and/or sufficient market demand sig-
nals to maintain competitive carbon prices. Similar to a
stock market the IIR members would have an interest in
reselling at high carbon market prices to increase the rev-
enue compared to the buying price and thus to limit the
risk of credit devaluation. In this way the banking and
reselling conditions under the IIR can also contribute to a
regulating effect in favor of price floors and caps in the car-
bon market. Additionally, to ensure environmental integ-
rity reselling can also be made conditional on the overall
allowable GHG concentration in the atmosphere, follow-
ing a global emission budget approach [19].
The reserve would also provide a clear advantage for
industrialized country governments for increasing their
emission reduction commitments. Under the current situ-
ation governments would have to increase their national
abatement targets in advance to avoid the risk of REDD
credits flooding the carbon market. However, by doing so
they take a high risk of belated or insufficient supply of
REDD credits in the future. Given the unfavorable govern-
ance and capacity situation in many developing countries
to successfully implement REDD [20] this risk is real. As a
consequence these governments would have to substitute
the lacking REDD supply with other emission abatement
options which would increase the overall emission reduc-
tion costs considerably. Thus, from a strategic perspective
governments would not choose higher abatement targets
as dominant strategy for REDD, because the supply uncer-
tainty would leave them in a situation of "first mover dis-
advantage". Under the IIR approach supply uncertainty
would diminish, allowing governments to react to supply
dynamics more flexible. Investment risks due to delivery
failure would still be possible. However, they could be
limited, if REDD unit payments from the IIR are divided
into up-front financing and continued payments. In case
fewer units are provided than initially offered, the differ-
ence is subtracted from the remaining payment obliga-Carbon Balance and Management 2009, 4:11 http://www.cbmjournal.com/content/4/1/11
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tions. Developing countries would also benefit from the
IIR approach, since large financial flows could be gener-
ated in a timely manner. To increase their confidence in
the mechanism, industrialized countries could commit a
certain minimum financing amount for each auctioning
period.
This is possible, since the IIR is compatible with nation-
ally-obtained contributions in form of AAU earmarking
and tax revenue finance for REDD as proposed by the
European Commission [21]. At the same time govern-
ments or private investors can use other forms of invest-
ment. According to their financial share in the IIR each
party (i.e. the respective government or private investor)
obtains emission units from REDD suppliers. IIR mem-
bers could either pool all units in a joint portfolio or dif-
ferentiate them according to different criteria. For the first
option they would be bought and collected in a common
REDD unit portfolio. For the second option unit pools
could be differentiated, e.g. by environmental and social
co-benefit level. The latter option might require separate
investment pools, if not all members agree on additional
incentive payments for higher standards. These REDD
units are then transferred into fungible, adjusted REDD
credits to be sold at the international carbon market or
used for increasing/meeting domestic abatement targets.
The IIR approach would also have the advantage that risks
of supply failure of REDD units as well as delivery failure
of MRV standards could be minimized by pooling large
REDD portfolios over time. By validating REDD units
through the IERSCC before they are finally transferred the
IIR can serve as quality catalyst for the carbon market or
for national compliance.
Auctioning of MRV REDD units to account for 
sustainability co-benefits
Under a purely carbon-focused REDD approach, national-
, regional- or project-level actions would be tailored to
maximize emission reductions. However, aggressive
implementation of REDD policies could run into conflict
with basic food security issues [22], create social conflict
and, under certain conditions, lead to further environ-
mental degradation on a total landscape level [7,23]. Such
conflicts can only be avoided if REDD policies are appro-
priately designed and implemented. In this respect, REDD
policies can be treated in a similar manner as biofuels, as
both are competing for land resources. Thus, it seems par-
amount that any action under the international REDD
mechanism should simultaneously recognize the differ-
ent ecological and social co-benefits that forests provide.
Funds and hybrid-market approaches can better accom-
pany such co-benefits than markets since they could dif-
ferentiate rules and criteria for REDD co-benefits without
being restricted to the carbon value or by credit buyer pref-
erences. However, such approaches are prone to ineffi-
ciency in incentive distribution, because they will most
likely operate based on fixed co-benefit premiums instead
of individual opportunity costs.
The mechanism outlined below describes how the provi-
sion of essential co-benefits of REDD can be made attrac-
tive and how at the same time incentives can be allocated
in a cost-efficient way using auctioning. For illustrative
purposes we discuss here a 'sealed bid second price auc-
tion' mechanism, where potential buyers classically sub-
mit their price bid in sealed envelopes. The buyer with the
highest price offered wins the bid, however, only has to
pay the second highest bid price submitted. Since the win-
ning bidder wins the difference between both prices it is a
dominant strategy for the bidder to bid her true value in a
'sealed bid second price auction'. In a simple ' open
ascending price auction' bidders would not bid their true
value, as this would eliminate their profit margin.
In the REDD context a 'sealed bid second price auction'
can work in a slightly different way. Here, we define the
seller to be the supplier of REDD emission reduction
units, whereas the buyer is the IIR. The IIR will initially
distribute its available investment into a fixed amount of
auctioning tranches. Emission reduction unit sellers will
then submit sealed bid proposals with a minimum selling
price per REDD unit and its targeted selling quantity to the
REDD IIR. The IIR selects the best bidder, who then can
sell its proposed quantity to the second-minimum selling
price. If the tranche still contains money, the next best
bidder can sell to the next lowest conditions. This contin-
ues until the finance is exhausted.
This auction can then be repeated in tranches of decreas-
ing finance quantity, until the provided finance portfolio
is exhausted or the targeted emission reduction quantity
of the IIR is reached. The decreasing tranches provide
incentives for REDD bidders to engage early in the auction
to be able to sell all offered units and thus supply REDD
credits at a price which better reflects their true cost of pro-
duction.
Such an auctioning approach can ensure that a fixed
quantitative REDD supply cap is achieved in a competi-
tive setting. It also avoids excessive producer rents by min-
imizing a REDD arbitrage gap (this is the difference
between the REDD costs and the potential revenue from
Annex I emission reduction credit supply). Furthermore,
auctioning allows for flexibility in targeting the allocation
of supply by geographic or thematic areas [24,25].
Co-benefit dimensions cover thematic areas such as the
retention of high conservation value forests and biodiver-
sity and the provision of social benefits such as mainte-
nance of employment or cultural services. What is neededCarbon Balance and Management 2009, 4:11 http://www.cbmjournal.com/content/4/1/11
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for quantifying co-benefits prior to the auction is the iden-
tification (and verification) of the absolute or relative
magnitude of these co-benefits. The measurement can be
orientated on current, widely applied certification proc-
esses, or through other means of measuring and verifying
sustainability co-benefits.
Using an auctioning approach there are two main options
to account for ancillary benefits in the auctioning mecha-
nism. Co-benefits could either be used as a qualifier crite-
rion or as a criterion for the pricing. The qualifier criterion
enables to participate in the financial compensation
mechanism by achieving a certain quality standard.
Besides the overall qualifier criterion to deliver measured,
reported and verified (MRV) REDD units, additional
social and environmental standards could be set for all
REDD credit providers. If the REDD provider fails to
achieve them, he would be excluded from the auction.
Alternatively, where the aim is maximizing sustainability
co-benefits of emission reductions under REDD, the com-
petitive criterion can be the relative provision of sustaina-
bility co-benefits. They can be measured as the quantified
and certified amount of ecosystem value points and social
value points. It can be calculated according to pre-speci-
fied co-benefit assessment rules associated with the fungi-
ble REDD unit. Ideally, such a value system would be
negotiated under the umbrella of a number of UN con-
ventions and charters. However, since a political consen-
sus on this issue is difficult to achieve, the determination
of the assessment rules could alternatively be restricted by
the parties involved in the financing of such co-benefits.
The relative co-benefit performance would then be trans-
lated into a co-benefit factor. Such factor can for example
range from 0.5 to 1.5. When provided REDD credits
ensure maximum co-benefit maintenance then the
offered price for the winning bidder would be increased
by the factor 1.5. If the winning bidder only provides the
lowest possible co-benefit protection his offered price
could be discounted by 0.5.
An alternative approach to use the relative co-benefit per-
formance as criterion for the pricing can be realized. Here,
the offered REDD units are distinguished into different
tranches according to the provided sustainability co-ben-
efit value points.
After a certain amount of REDD units of the highest tier
(determined by a minimum amount of co-benefit value
points) has been purchased, the auctioneer lowers the
minimum points (and the provided finance) to qualify
for the next tier of REDD units in the next auction tranche
and collects bids at this lower sustainability co-benefit
value level. The IIR continues to lower the points (and
finance) until the targeted REDD units are bought or the
finance portfolio is exhausted.
For both options where sustainability co-benefits are used
for the pricing of REDD credits, the sealed bid second-
price auction allows maximizing the total sustainability
benefit value of a REDD action. This would shift the
incentive structure for REDD policy action designs from
the simple maximization of emission avoidance to a more
comprehensive approach of both emission-avoidance and
ecosystem co-benefit maximization.
The introduced novel design elements of IERSCC for
monitoring and RL development and the IIR for auction-
ing and catalysing REDD credits are interrelated and can
help to overcome current methodological and political
challenges. Their connections and interdependencies are
summarized in Figure 2.
Conclusion
There is general agreement in REDD policy circles that
emission reduction units generated by any REDD mecha-
nism under the UNFCCC must be "real" and environmen-
tally integer. Key to the supply of "real" REDD credits is an
appropriate reference level against which additional
REDD efforts can be measured, and compensation can
subsequently be claimed. For compensation mechanisms,
appropriate RL are necessary, irrespective of whether
REDD credits are supplied to funds, are made fungible to
markets or involve any other REDD implementation
design.
As was alluded to earlier, a danger exists that if the meth-
odology for setting RL is not carefully designed it will lead
to non additional emission reductions and potentially to
an inflated supply of REDD credits. There is the inherent
problem of generating and exploiting information asym-
metries, which countries will want to exploit by increasing
the emission levels for their emission reference scenario.
Because the "true" REDD effort is poorly observable, indi-
vidual market agents are inclined to use the information
asymmetry to over-report on their individual efforts and
the easiest way to inflate reported efforts is to increase the
RL. That is why we have proposed the establishment of an
International Emission Reference Scenario Coordination
Centre (IERSCC), specifically tasked to establish globally
consistent national reference emission scenarios based on
standardized and consistent data and algorithms, accord-
ing to the outcomes of the continuing REDD negotiations
under the UNFCCC. RL will need to be established in a
globally consistent manner in order to address the prob-
lems of geographic and sectoral leakage. The issue of leak-
age is closely linked to the issue of how drivers of
deforestation are included in RL and it rapidly becomes
highly contextual. For example, RL of one place or country
can depend on the actions of REDD by other market par-
ticipants. In a particular country where forest conversion
is due to the expansion of intensive agriculture, REDDCarbon Balance and Management 2009, 4:11 http://www.cbmjournal.com/content/4/1/11
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actions in this area can lead to high leakage to other
regions/countries. However, if e.g. the driver is extensive
cattle-ranching and if REDD measures target the intensifi-
cation of livestock production systems, then geographic
leakage will most likely be small. Thus, RL setting of one
country might need to account for the ensemble of global
REDD actions, or even more general land-use impacting
policies such as biofuel supporting policies.
More realistic reference scenarios would also lead to more
transparency and finally to "fairness" in the REDD proc-
ess. "Real" RL are a precondition for more robust cooper-
ation between parties under the UNFCCC.
Asymmetrically inflated RL would lead to windfall profits
for the inflating countries, resulting in an unfair allocation
of global financial resources dedicated to REDD. Due to
its inflated reference emission scenario, country X might
receive all of the global REDD resources and country Y
would get nothing by imposing a stringent reference sce-
nario and thus loosing competitiveness. However, under
a consistent framework of globally harmonized and con-
sistent national reference emission scenarios, countries X
and Y would share the globally available REDD resources
in a fair manner as they would be compensated for their
real efforts.
There are two main problems associated with the asym-
metric inflation reference scenario. First, cooperation
within tropical countries would be put under threat.
Clearly, country Y would try to sabotage negotiations
under such conditions, since it would face a loss of reve-
nues from a global REDD mechanism while its competing
tropical country would be gaining revenues. Second,
REDD credit buyers would face an environmental integ-
rity problem. The entity sourcing REDD credits could ex-
post be blackmailed for having undermined the environ-
mental integrity of its emission reduction claims and have
spent a large share of its resources on REDD hot air.
Besides the prevented information asymmetries, the
IERSCC could provide data much cheaper than under
pure nationally-based monitoring and earth observation
systems. Its associated costs could for example be gener-
ated by establishing a tax on sold REDD credits, based on
individual donor contributions or by the IIR.
The financing of REDD under an 'International Invest-
ment Reserve' would allow the timely provision of large
sums for REDD. Sufficient up-front financing can be
ensured to tackle deforestation in meaningful quantities,
since the IIR allows combining financial resources from
national governments targeting market and fund
approaches as well as private investments. Details on the
management of such IIR still need to be determined, but
rich experiences from other study fields exist. The main
challenges - similar to the IERSCC - will be to avoid insti-
tutional overburdening while at the same time allowing
the participation of all relevant stakeholders. The IIR auc-
Institutional relationship Figure 2
Institutional relationship. Relationship among the International Emission Reference Scenario Coordination Centre 
(IERSCC) the International Investment Reserve (IIR) and the carbon market under an auctioning approach.Carbon Balance and Management 2009, 4:11 http://www.cbmjournal.com/content/4/1/11
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tioning approach also needs to avoid single country dom-
ination such as in the CDM. The participation rules for
REDD unit provider should thus take into account their
total supply provision to avoid auction domination. For
the auctioning mechanism broad participation could be
ensured using multiple tranches of finance provision.
Subsequent tranches would be lowered in their fixed
amount of money to give an incentive to large suppliers
for early offers as well as maintaining the option for small
(and possibly more expensive) REDD suppliers to partici-
pate in the later tranches.
Compliance with environmental and social standards
could be ensured through appropriate auditing and possi-
ble certification, as an entry condition to participate in the
mechanism. Such certification using for example existing
REDD standards such as the Climate, Community & Bio-
diversity Alliance's (CCBA, http://www.climate-stand
ards.org/) could act as a qualifying trait. However, due to
heterogeneous priorities and capacities in developing
countries, an ambitious standard would most likely over-
burden the REDD negotiations. Thus, alternatively to a
co-benefit qualifying trait a relative quantification of co-
benefits as competitive trait provides several advantages.
First, it allows maximizing co-benefit provision. But even
more important, it can function as additional incentive
without excluding REDD providers, which would other-
wise fail a high co-benefit standard. We provided alterna-
tive options how to incentivize co-benefit performance.
The sequential differentiation of tranches according to co-
benefit performance would only provide meaningful
incentives, if large amounts of REDD units with high co-
benefit provision would exist. This however remains spec-
ulative. If the co-benefit factor would instead be used as
competitive trait, the REDD providers would be incentiv-
ized to provide a low unit price and high co-benefit per-
formance without limiting the participation to a specific
tranche. The use of the co-benefit factor will also make it
harder for REDD providers to speculate on the prices of
their co-bidders in each auction, thus limiting the threat
of strategic pricing.
What is essential to note is that in such a co-benefit max-
imising auction design the underlying causes of deforest-
ation and degradation (e.g. poverty) might be attacked
more effectively, and would allow for a wide portfolio of
REDD implementation instruments. In addition, it needs
to be recognized that REDD, if it is purely focused on car-
bon, will create additional pressure on forests with low
carbon stocks such as the Brazilian Cerrado, which is a
known biodiversity hotspot. This "biodiversity leakage"
effect of REDD within the forest domain needs to be
addressed.
To increase the precision of the proposed REDD mecha-
nism with respect to sustainability co-benefit provision, it
will be necessary to map with higher precision, and more
comprehensively, the ecosystems and societal values per
se, and agree at the international level on how to quantify
co-benefits, such that they could be incorporated into the
proposed mechanism. The spatial and temporal deforest-
ation driver data from IERSCC could assist in this task.
Besides these more ambitious requirements for the com-
petitive trait, the auction mechanism design should be
implemented using robust but simple MRV standards as
qualifying criteria to sell REDD units. This is crucial, if suf-
ficient competition should develop, since currently only a
handful of countries are "REDD ready". To reach these
robust MRV standards REDD readiness funding will be
crucial in the coming years. The flexible structure of the
IIR will allow early and fluent phasing from such a fund-
ing approach towards the proposed investment reserve.
Both Annex I as well as Non-Annex I countries are cur-
rently working towards a policy process ensuring that RL
are supplied in a transparent, consistent, comparable and
accurate manner. It is commonly understood that "real"
reference level are a necessary precondition for financial
REDD resources to be deployed in a manner that is effi-
cient, effective and, most importantly, distributed among
recipients in a fair manner. We argue that an integral and
robust REDD policy process ought to be based on inde-
pendent and globally consistent data compilation, and
harmonized computation of appropriate reference scenar-
ios. To achieve this, we advocate the establishment of an
'International Emission Reference Scenario Coordination
Centre', as an important part of a robust REDD policy
process.
Of similar importance as sound reference levels is the pro-
vision of a powerful financing mechanism for REDD,
which should not contribute to market flooding but lead
to sustained and sustainable investments in forest preser-
vation.
We offer a new financial framework of an 'International
Investment Reserve', which enables the timely provision
of sufficient financial resources without risking carbon
market flooding. The IIR will allow to combine REDD
finance generation such as classical market investment
and fund approaches. This investment reserve can be used
to obtain REDD units from supplier countries under an
auctioning approach. This allows to pool risks and uncer-
tainties, and subsequently, to resell these verified credits
to the carbon market or use them for national compliance
purposes. To avoid market flooding, credits will be
banked and the reselling will be constrained by criteria to
ensure environmental integrity as well as carbon price
floors and caps. This helps to smoothen price volatility.Carbon Balance and Management 2009, 4:11 http://www.cbmjournal.com/content/4/1/11
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REDD will not only contribute to mitigating climate
change but might also emerge as a major tool to conserve
the ecosystem and wider societal values of forests. In this
paper, we have explored new ways of how to build "eco-
system and social services" into the carbon economy.
Understanding that biodiversity, ecosystem services and
other services of forests to society (and the related REDD
opportunity costs) are not distributed evenly across the
forests of the world, we propose a mechanism design for
REDD implementation which allows to maximize carbon
and ecosystem co-benefit provision without excluding
REDD credit providers.
Consequently, REDD will only be successful in the long
term, if it manages the balance between environmental
integrity, economic efficiency and political robustness.
The REDD mechanism design proposals of two independ-
ent REDD institutions, the IERSCC and IIR, introduced in
this paper can positively contribute to this endeavour.
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